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Abstract
Sustainability as an unambiguous policy goal is not a priori secured,  as is clearly
shown in the transport sector, where  the negative externalities are stil1 increasing
despite official polities  aiming  at a reduction of these external  costs and at the
achievement of a sustainable transport system. To analyse why this is the case, a
conceptual model is developed in this paper, in which stakeholders are identified
which influence sustainable transport polities.  These stakeholders are individuals,
the public sector (subdivided into politicians and civil  servants), international
organizations and pressure groups (car industry, oil industry, car users and
environmental groups). It appears that - although it may be assumed that nobody
desires an unsustainable future - most incentives and mechanisms  in our con-
ceptual model of the decision-making  process  hamper  the achievement of a
sustainable transport system. In the second  part - by way of empirical test -
results of a questionnaire among Dutch transportation experts on the expected
and desired future of European passenger transport are concisely discussed,  in
which the year 2030 is taken as a reference year. It appears that in the expected
future the stakeholders largely behave as predicted in the conceptual model. In
the desired future, however,  the stakeholders have to change their attitudes
drastically . It is concluded that a strategy focused on behavioural changes  of
stakeholders is necessary for the achievement of sustainability goals. Sufficient
and appealing information, the existente  of alternatives for car use and a
cooperation of al1 stakeholders are key success factors  for the achievement of a
sustainable transport system in the future.
1 Introduction
In a simple atomistic society driven by market forces, individual citizens
operate  on the basis of optimizing their utility in a Pareto-optimal way . When  no
transaction costs occur, even externalities wil1  be included in the market decision
(Coase,  1988; Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1996). Of course, transaction costs do exist
in the real world, so that in a somewhat more complex and ordered society a
govemment may have to intervene in order to provide  services and polities  to
cape  with market failures, so that a more or less social optimum outcome is
secured  .
However,  in practice,  governmental polities  and outcomes of decision-
making  processes  in society are not that simple. Also other stakeholders play an
important role, while each stakeholder has his own utility function. Also individ-
uals may not always seem to act in a rational way, while governments may have
own utility functions,  which differ from the societal ones. Therefore, the out-
comes of a certain policy-making  process  may not result  in socially optimal
outcomes.
When  the results of the great many attempts and polities  to achieve  more
sustainability in transport are analysed, this observation seems to hold very  well.
Officially, polities  aim at achieving sustainable transport, by reducing congestion
and stimulating public transport. In reality however,  these polities  are not very
successful. In every  European country the mobility levels increase, the modal
split changes  in favour of the car and airplane, and the emissions of harmful
gases increase. As a result,  the extemal costs of car use may be as large as 3 %
of the European GNP (Verhoef, 1994). In fact,,  this is a strange observation,
since almost  no individual in society wishes the environment to detoriate. At the
same time congestion - especially in large cities and densely populated regions -
becomes an increasing problem, which is not coped with in an effective  way.
Therefore, it seems that new policy solutions and strategies are hardly found
for the transport system, so that the problems tend to increase. Apparently , there
are forces which push the system in a direction, which is not desired. In this
paper it is analysed why this is the case and which changes  are necessary in the
decision-making  process  to achieve  a more sustainable transport system.
The contents  of this paper is as follows. In Section  2 a conceptual model on
the decision-making  process  in the transport sector is presented, which explains
the question why this is the case. In Section  3 this model is tested in an empiri-
cal way by analysing the opinions of Dutch transportation experts on the
expected and desired future of the transport sector. Strategie  policy conclusions
are drawn in Section  4.
2 A Conceptual Model of Stakeholders
In light of the above-mentioned observations, it makes sense to identify
stakeholders in the process  for achieving sustainable transport, to analyse the
incentives of these stakeholders and to explain why the transport system stil1
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moves away from sustainability. Such an analysis may be carried  out  by applying
public choice theories to the transport sector, so by applying an economie
analysis to the outcomes of the decision-making processes  which should - but do
not - lead to a sustainable transport system.
There are two ways of policy analysis in public choice theory (Rietveld,
1995). The normative approach analyses the optimal outcome of a process, by
determining which outcome is Pareto-optimal. The second analysis is the positive
approach, in which the actual outcome of the decision-making process is
analysed. Here, we wil1  focus on the second type of analysis, applied to
sustainable transport polities.
In public choice theories, the basic  assumption is that every  human  being
acts as if he were a ratio4 utility maximiser (see e.g., Dunleavy , 1991). This
assumption provides  a clear basis for analysing the behaviour of individuals,
although one also should pay attention to theories, which explain non-rational
behaviour. There are however  also attempts to rationalize this behaviour (see
e.g.,Brady et al., 1995).
Eventually,  it may be possible to change incentives of the stakeholders in
one way or another, so that current trends may bend into the direction, which is
desired by society at large. A conceptual model which presents the influence of
the main  stakeholders on (sustainable) transport choices is presented in Figure 1.
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Figure  1 A concept&  model of stakeholders in a decision-muking process towards
sustainable transport
Only the strongest relations are presented in Figure 1; it should be acknowl-
edged that of course also other relations hold, which are assurned to be less
strong, however.  Polities  to change e.g. the behaviour of individuals or the R &
D of the car industry (which may be an important pressure group) are included
in the ‘sustainable transport’ box. Next, we wil1  discuss  the behaviour, incentives
and relations of the distinct stakeholders.
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2.1 Individuals and sustainable transport
The first group of stakeholders in the transport system is formed by the
individuals. In the end these are the consumers of transport; the behaviour of
this group is therefore critical for the achievement of sustainability . This group
of stakeholders may influence the road to sustainable transport directly, but also
via other stakeholders as was already  shown in Figure 1.
In the past decades, individualism has become a megatrend in society.
Individuals seem to act more and more like ‘calculating citizens’, who are
oriented towards monetary gains and their own societal position. The influence
of e. g . , churches, labour unions  and other societal organizations has diminished.
As a result,  it seems that altruistic behaviour has decreased too, which is also
reflected in public polities  which tend to abolish e.g., social security systems,
subsidies for social support, and subsidies for housing of lower income  groups. A
consequente  is that it becomes more difficult for govemments to steer the
individuals, while (financial) incentives and market-based interventions are
increasingly becoming more important. Individuals behave thus more and more
as if they were rational (calculating) citizens, as is largely assumed in the public
choice literature. This however,  may lead to outcomes which do not seem
rational, e.g., because acquiring information is not free (time and monetary
costs). In this respect it should be added, that information has become much
cheaper in the past decades (radio, television), a trend which is stil1 continuing
(e.g., the development of ‘the electronic  highway’); therefore, individuals are
becoming better informed. At the same time, the overload of information leads
to the observation that the presentation of information becomes increasingly
important; otherwise the information is lost because it is not appealing.
In the decision-making  process  of these individual stakeholders, information
is the starting  point. The decision is first of al1 determined by (perceived)
altematives. The final choice between these alternatives is made on the basis of
a cognitive  and motivational decision-making  process,  making  use of the avai-
lable knowledge of the altematives, perceived or presupposed pros and cons,
personal preferences and attitudes, and social and individual norms. In other
words, the altematives are traded-off against each other, which is, however,  only
partly rational and very  strongly biased (Rooijers and Steg, 1991). The above-
mentioned factors  wil1  now concisely be discussed,  using partly the behavioural
theories of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) and Ronis et al. (1989).
Knowledge
An optimal rational choice between alternatives includes first of al1 that al1
possibilities are known in an objective  way. This is often not the case, however.
In transport, for example, those people who travel little or not at al1 by public
transport hardly see it as an altemative. The knowledge from which a choice has
to be made is usually just a subset of al1 feasible possibilities; this leads to the
first subjective  bias in the decision-making  process.
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Perceived pros and  cons
An optimal objective choice further presumes that al1 pros and cons  of the
alternatives are known, and then have to be weighted on a rational basis. In
reality , these conditions are not fulfilled, because they are both largely biased as
a result  of selective  perception  and cognitive dissonante  mechanisms  (Festinger,
1954). People try to reduce  this dissonante  psychologically to the maximum
extent by (Brady et al., 1995):
* revoking the decision when new information comes available;
* making  the own decision more attractive;
* reducing the attractiveness of altematives;
* avoiding to get new information;
* providing funds to e.g., an environmental organization which claims to be the
solution for a problem.
As a result,  people in genera1 are inclined to overestimate the advantages
and to underestimate the disadvantages of their own way of behaviour, while for
the altematives the opposite holds  true. In transport, for example, the costs,
travelling time and environmental pollution linked with car use are often triviali-
zed, whereas long travelling times and lack of comfort in public transport and
bicycles are emphasized (Rooijers, 1992). Only when the dissonante  on the
current situation and behaviour becomes so large that it is impossible to deny  it,
the behaviour of individuals may change.
Individual preferences and  attitudes
Besides these cognitive factors  also motivational and even emotional factors
play a significant role. Such factors  include aspects such as pleasure, privacy,
status, personal control  and representativeness. In transport, these factors  may
largely contribute  to the preferente  for individual travel modes.
Social  and personal values
People do not live in isolation, but act in a social context, which may have a
substantial influence on the decision-making  process  and the behaviour of a
person.  In fact, people are strongly motivated to compare  themselves with other
relevant groups and to conform to genera1 trends in a social context (Festinger,
1957). Here too, it should be observed that especially individually perceived
social norms are important, which differ from objective standards. So the result
is that the perceived social norms are distorted or influenced by individual
preferences and attitudes.
Not only social but also personal norms may be relevant as well. These are
the individual’s behavioural motives, which are of importante  for himself, but
which are more or less isolated from his individual preferences and perceived
social norms. For instance, an individual may have a strong preferente  for car
use, but nevertheless he chooses to use his bike for health reasons.
So the existente  of habits  hampers  the possibility to change behaviour. To
break out  of undesirable habitual behaviour the individual wil1  first need to have
knowledge about al1 relevant alternatives (Ronis et al., 1989). Subsequently, the
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decision-making process itself can be influenced by control  measures that affect
the factors  mentioned before.
Consequences for  transport
It is thus clear  that there is a bias in the behaviour of individuals, which is
rather  conservatively oriented. This is a major obstacle for the achievement of a
sustainable transport system (relationship 1 in Figure 1). Both the travel need
and the travel mode choice are important in this respect; the first one is not
discussed in this paper, although especially land use and residential polities  may
structurally reduce  travel needs. It may also be concluded that the freedom in
the transport decision-making process is mainly limited to the travel mode
selection regarding new and incidental trips. When  this process would also take
into account repeated similar trips, positive experiences (or absente  of negative
experiences) with a certain travel mode may act as a positive reinforcement of
the choice made before, which increases the chance that on the next occasion
the same mode wil1  be chosen  (Rooijers and Steg, 1991). This may have at least
two important consequences:
* there is hardly an explicit  choice; the travel mode is used because it was
used before, and therefore other altematives are even not considered;
* persistent prejudices  and misperceptions may develop which can hardly be
remedied .
It should be acknowledged that the chance of habit  formation is probably
the highest for car use, because the car is more multi-functional than other travel
modes; therefore, it has a highly attractive  value; as a result,  car use wil1  not
quickly lead to negative experiences.
In conclusion, because of the mechanisms  described above individuals are
biased towards their previous behaviour; there are little incentives to change
behaviour, and it wil1  be very  hard for public transport and/or  new technologies
to gain a large(r)  market share in the transport sector,.
As wil1  be discussed in Subsection 2.4, the influence of individuals on several
pressure groups - especially the car industry and environmental groups - may be
rather  high (relationship 2 in Figure 1). The first is dependent on the demand  in
the market, while the second  may reduce  dissonante  of individuals. However,  in
practice  this potential stil1 has to mobilized. The above observed psychological
bias may hamper  this mobilization. The same holds  for the influence of indivi-
duals on politicians (relationship 3 in Figure 1). The latter wil1  be further dis-
cussed in Subsection 2.2).
2.2 The government and sustainable transport
The next important stakeholder is the govemment (relationship 4 in Figure
1). Governments may influence the achievement of sustainable transport largely,
by introducing regulations, imposing taxes, providing subsidies, etc. In theory , the
govemment should aim in this way at a social optimal result  in which the
environmental impacts have to be weighted against economie  (monetary) gains.
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At present, devolution trends seem to dominate governmental polities.
There are clear trends towards privatization, deregulation and govemments
‘stepping back’, e.g., by reducing social benefits, subsidies, etc. Market forces
seem to become more dominant in al1 regulated sectors. One of the well-known
examples in transport are the polities  to make railway companies  more indepen-
dent of govemments; in some countries railways may even be privatized (e.g., in
the United Kingdom). It may be concluded that also the government is increa-
singly subject to market forces and is increasingly rationalized on the basis of
efficiency principles  (Self, 1993).
In public choice theories it is taken for granted that govemments are
composed  of people, who have also their own indigenous objectives  and utility
functions. Important in this respect is that mostly a distinction is made between
politicians (and politica1 parties) on the one hand, and civil servants on the other
hand. This distinction may be necessary because of the different utility functions
both groups may have. Both groups wil1  subsequently be discussed.
Politicians and  sustainable transport
In public choice theory it is assumed that politicians are in the first place
focused on re-election (Frey, 1983). Only when this is more or less secured,
ideologies and altruism may come into play. Certainly in the present time, when
voters seem to shift very  easily from one party to another, the re-election
receives  more emphasis than in the past; this reduces the possibilities for
politicians to act in an altruistic way, e.g. in order to stimulate a sustainable
transport policy stronger than desired by the voters (relationship 3 in Figure 1).
As a consequente, it may be expected that politicians wil1  carefully monitor and
follow the opinions of their voters. For sustainable transport again, the inherent
conservatism  of citizens is relevant for the behaviour and span of control  of
politicians.
At the same time, one should be aware of the large shifts in opinion of
voters. As observed by Rietveld (1995),  the priorities of voters may drastically
change, depending also on genera1 economie  conditions, unexpected disasters or
threats, etc. For example, in the Dutch election  in the year 1989 environmental
issues had a high priority in the view of voters, in the year 1986 environmental
issues had a much lower priority. Also in recent years, environmental issues seem
to receive  less attention.
Particularly important in this respect is thus the voting behaviour of indivi-
duals. During election  periods people may vote for parties which promise  to care
for social and environmental issues. However,  when measures are introduced
which influence the life of the voter, these measures are often strongly opposed.
As a result,  politicians may act in a different way during election  time than after
the elections. One of the basic  assumptions may therefore be, that ‘politica1
parties formulate polities  in order to win the elections, rather  than winning
elections in order to formulate polities’  (Downs, 1957). A result  of this observa-
tion  is, that politicians often  remain vague during election  times, promise  too
much  (only to some extent, the credibility is also important), and try to bind the
median voters (see e.g.,Mueller, 1989).
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Another important observation is that voters may choose for a party because
of many  relevant subjects  involved. It is likely that one party wil1  have a prefe-
rente  for a given subject (e.g., financial/budgetary  policy), while another party is
preferred for other reasons (e.g., environment) . A voter has to make a trade-off,
and wil1  vote for the party with the optimal mixture.  A result,  however,  may be
that the preferences of al1 voters are not consistent, as is witnessed by the Arrow
paradox (A > B, B > C, A > C; see also Downs, 1957). This provides  a
politician some degrees of freedom, which however  may be used for personal
gains. Additional objectives  of politicians which are often mentioned in the
literature are: getting monetary benefits, increasing personal power, receiving a
place in history (books), altruism, ideology, etc.
An important feature of many environmental issues (especially climate
change problems) are the long term impacts and the wide range of solutions that
are necessary. Because of the short  term in which elections take place, such long
term problems tend to be more or less neglected by politicians. The main  reason
is that it is not possible for politicians to present results of their polities  before
the next elections, while at the same time there are many  negative impacts for
their voters (e.g., restrictions in car use). This trend may be reinforced by the
increasing impact of the media in past decades. Because individuals can more
easily be reached and informed, the degrees of freedom for politicians are
decreasing even more.
In this respect also the policy cycle as presented by Van Dijk (1991) may be
illustrative. This cycle is as follows:
* the environment becomes a politica1 issue (e.g., because of a disaster, new
information);
* the issue is taken over by politicians and it becomes an electoral  issue, there-
fore many  policy measures are promised;
* after  the elections concrete targets and instruments are to be introduced.  An
‘information battle’ starts, in which lobby groups (e.g., environmental groups,
industries, etc.) inform the policy maker. As wil1  be noted in Subsection 2.4
environmental groups may be weaker  in this respect than their competitors;
* new decisions are taken; however,  in the previous stage many possibilities
are not regarded as acceptable, while later on the issue may not be that
relevant anymore in politics; therefore, strong measures are (often)  not
introduced.
Civil servants  and sustainable transport
Civil servants wil1  normally have a utility function, which differs from the
societal or the politica1 one; this may sometimes lead to a suboptimal allocation
of funds because of reasons of bureaucratie  power or self-esteem  (Nijkamp and
Rienstra, 1996). An example of such a utility function is discussed  in the budget
maximization theory (see e.g., Dunleavy, 1991),  which takes for granted that the
utility function of civil  servants correlates  positively with the public budget he
has at his disposal. Since the civil  servant has a monopoly position in the provi-
sion  of information to the parliament, he wil1  supply information with the
intention that the intervention leve1 is higher  than in the societal optimal
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situation. This is illustrated by a graphical presentation in Figure 2, in which a
simple situation is presented with linear tost  and revenue curves and without
fiied costs. In this figure the leve1 of intervention is supposed to be related to
the budget of the civil servant: a budget of a civil servant increases when the
intervention leve1 increases .
cow-ua marginal  coats
Figure  2 í’Xe  intervention leve1 under  a budget maximizing  civil servant
When  the parliament would have full information, it would choose the
intervention leve1 at which the marginal costs would equal the marginal rev-
enues, which corresponds to an intervention leve1 of i,, which is optimal. A civil
servant however,  may provide  only information about the total costs, and as a
result  the parliament may decide  to intervene at (somewhat left of) the point
where  the average  total costs equal the average  total revenues, which corre-
sponds  to intervention leve1 i,. This is optimal for the civil servant since it
maximises his budget, but it is suboptimal from a societal point of view. In this
respect it is als0 important to notice  that the costs of receiving information of
third (neutral) parties is high in most cases. There are also other theories, like
the bureau shaping theory (Dumeavy,  1991). In this theory higher  ranked civil
servants are not focused on budget maximising, but on status, prestige, patronage
and influence of their work tasks. This objective  may not correspond with
maximizing budgets, but also not with the achievement of a social optimal result.
In general,  it may be concluded however,  that the objectives  of civil servants do
not necessarily have to fit with attempts to achieve  a social optimum.
In theory, there are also other circumstances which increase the influence of
civil servants, but which may not result  in a social optimum (Frey, 1983):
* there is in the public sector little incentive to act in a socially optimal way; a
civil servant is seldom confronted with the consequences of decisions ,
especially when he acted in the formally right way;
* it is difficult to measure and evaluate the output;
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* there is no clear market demand  for their publicly offered services, because
mostly public goods are provided;
* citizens avoid to get problems with civil servants, because they need them for
getting permits, etc. ;
* in the public sector there are often  limited possibilities for extra wage
increases, promotions, etc., so that there may be little incentives for a good
performance.
This attitude may result  in suboptimal solutions, in which the governmental
influence becomes too large, while changes  in strategies and polities  are not
stimulated. In transport, this may result  in a too large intervention in the trans-
port system. Some consequences may be:
* the price  asked for using the infrastructure  may be too low, e.g., to satisfy
car users (which is a powerful pressure group) and to maximize subsidies
(budgets);
* public transport companies  are protected too much,  because then the influ-
ence of civil servants is the highest;
* new technologies  and ideas are not introduced,  in order to avoid failures.
One of the conclusions may be that the influence of individuals on the
behaviour of civil servants may be expected to be small, as is also demonstrated
in Figure 1. The utility function of civil servants may result  in suboptimal
solutions and hamper  the creation of new policy strategies and solutions.
2.3 International organizations and sustainable transport
From a public choice point of view, countries tend to join  an international
organization (as a club) when (Vaubel, 1991):
* international externalities occur, which result  in an underproduction of
international public goods (e.g., peace keeping) and/or  an overexploitation
of common resources (e.g., emissions of greenhouse gases; water supply in
certain areas);
* intemational economies  of scale occur in the production of public goods
(e.g., intemational standards for certain goods; stimulation of R & D of
certain industries);
* cooperation is beneficial for al1 parties; non-cooperative behaviour produces
suboptimal outcomes (‘prisoners dilemma’) and cooperative behaviour
improves the outcome (e . g . , international trade agreements , environmental
measures); free riding is a main  problem in this case.
International organizations become increasingly important for al1 kinds of
polities.  This is the result  of the strong globalization of the world economy;
markets  are opened and liberalized, requirements for products  are standardized,
etc. In transport this results in an increasing cooperation of countries, e.g., in the
construction of a HST-network and other Trans European Networks. This
increasing importante  is especially the case in Europe, where  the European
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Union  gains more and more influence in polities,  while national govemments
lose autonomy .
As a result,  environmental measures are also taken by international organi-
zations, in order to prevent ‘free rider’ behaviour of certain countries. This trend
is also observed in the transport market (relationship 7 in Figure 1). Several
examples can be given of the decreased freedom of national govemments in the
transport market:
* fuel prices  cannot be determined in an independent way, because people
may buy fuel ‘on the other side of the border’;
* protection of the railways is abolished, because of new European regula-
tions;
* companies are becoming increasingly ‘ footloose’ : when environmental
measures are taken in one country, companies invest  in other countries
where  the resulting costs are lower; a well-known example are the dis-
cussions in several countries about the introduction of a CO 2 tax;
* in an integrating economy  like the EU, certain measures are often  for-
bidden, because it may hamper  free trade principles.
It may concluded, that many measures have to be taken within intemational
organizations. At the same time, one country can often hamper  the introduction
of measures because of voting procedures within these organizations. As a
consequente,  also many  independent issues are politically linked to each other,
which hampers  the effective  introduction of new polities.  This inertia  is rein-
forced  by the frequent insufficient  democratie  control:  media are in genera1
nationally-oriented, while the democratie  mechanisms  do not work within
intemational organizations, and especially individuals seem to have little interest
and influence in these organizations. Therefore, polities  of international organi-
zations are prepared in a ‘black box’, in which lobbies  of individual countries and
pressure groups fruitfully  operate.
2.4 Pressure groups and sustainable transport
The final group of stakeholders identified in the conceptual model is made
up of pressure groups, which may have a far-reaching influence on polities  of
both governments and intemational organizations (relationships 6 and 8 in
Figure 1). At the same time individuals influence the existente,  behaviour and
impact of pressure groups (relationship 2).
Pressure groups tend to come only into existente  when collective  efforts
provide  certain advantages to the members of a group. Their activity can be
considered as a public good; therefore, there are little incentives to become a
member. There are three conditions however,  which may make a group stable
and effective  (Frey, 1983):
* in smal1 groups free riding becomes impossible because of social control;  this
makes smal1 pressure groups often more effective  than large ones;
1 0
* a group may provide  a private good to the members; therefore, it becomes
attractive  to join  the club. Well-known examples are mobile repair  services
for car drivers, an interesting joumal,  access to information, etc. However,
also organizing social activities may be a reason to join,  or the feeling to
belong to an exclusive  club;
* governments may force a group focusing on a specific  issue into existente,
because they prefer to deal with forma1 groups.
Individuals with common interests, but without sharing explicitly one of the
above reasons, constitute  ‘latent groups’ . These groups only may come into
existente  when polities  interfere too much in a negative way . As a result,  groups
in society differ in power and strength: labour unions  and employer organizati-
ons, for example, are wel1  organized, while consumers and tax payers do not
have powerful pressure groups. Also environmental lobbies  may be relatively
weak because of their large size  and diffuse objectives.  By negotiating, the most
powerful groups may gain advantages at the expense of the less powerful  ones.
For each intervention measure the costs per individual (consumer,  tax payer)
may be so low and unclear, that it is not rational to resist the measure (like
minimum prices,  protection measures, etc.).
Strong groups may have much power in a decision-making  process  (Mueller,
1989). Governments often  depend  on information provided by the groups, while
in exchange they may receive  services from the public sector. They also may
influence voter groups or mobilize people.
As observed above, the influence of pressure groups in intemational organi-
zations may be large, in particular because of the lower democratie  control  and
the low participation of individuals in the process  (relationship 8 in Figure 1).
Also the efficiency of lobbies  of national governments seems to be very  impor-
tant in the decision-making  process  of intemational organizations (relationship
5).
Several groups may be identified which influence the transport sector to a
large extent (relationship 9):
* the car (and aviation) industry;
* railway companies;
* associations of car drivers;
* the oil industry;
* environmental groups .
These groups wil1  now briefly be discussed.
The car  industry
The car industry is first focused on maximizing profits and on the protection
of its market share. In the end, this industry is often dependent on the demand
in the market, i.e. on individuals. Individuals are clients of either the car
industry , the railways or other transport suppliers in order to satisfy their travel
demand.  In a free market, one may assume that supply is determined by demand
of individuals, so that the car industry would follow the demand  of citizens.
1 1
Because of the reasons mentioned in previous sections however,  citizens seem to
be very  conservative  in their attitude towards changes,  and therefore the car
industry seems to have little incentives for developing more sustainable cars and
transport technologies.
In the past decades, a strong concentration has taken place in the car
industry . As a result,  very  large companies are now present in many  countries
(e. g . , Germany , France, Japan, etc.), which provide  much employment and form
an important economie  sector. As a result,  these companies have a strong
influence on govemment polities  at both the national and the intemational level.
For example, the European car industry which is facing an increasing competi-
tion  of Japanese and American car industries has - as a result  of their large
economie  importante  for the European market - been heavily protected.
Another example of the influence of this industry can be found in the tax credits
given in France and Spain  when people buy a new car; this measure was taken
in order to stimulate employment in the car industry . A main  aim of these
industries may be to protect  their investments once made, and to reduce  costly
investments in new technologies which are not directly asked for in the market.
As a result,  investments in environmental friendly technologies may be low.
Railway companies
A second  important player at the interface of transport and environment is
formed by the railway (and other public transport) companies. Governments
have invested largely in rail infrastructure  and have usually covered  exploitation
losses of these companies, while - as a result  of ownership conditions - govern-
ments were also otherwise highly involved in these companies. Rail companies
seem to have a strong lobby at the national level, because stimulating public
transport is a main  objective  of most governments in order to reduce  congestion
and environmental impacts. Also the social task of public transport - providing
mobility possibilities to people who cannot afford  a car, elderly , remote regions,
etc. - makes this sector important for govemment polities.  Finally, also the
employment in this sector is considerable,  while the employees in this sector are
often  highly organized in labour unions  and are also eager to strike, which may
have strong economie  and social impacts.
Associations of car  drivers
A third influential group is formed by associations of car drivers. Because of
the strong psychological impact of car driving, strong anti-car  measures are very
unpopular and opposed by strong lobby groups in al1 countries. These pressure
groups have succeeded in having a large amount of members, e. g . by providing
mobile repair  services and popular journals. As a consequente,  the influence of
these groups may be extremely high, also because they are able to mobilize
many  people. Restrictions on car use are therefore unpopular in every  western
country.
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The oil industry
Another important pressure group may be the oil industry . In the first  place,
this sector employs many  people, but also the financial power of this industry is
extremely high. It is obvious that this industry favours the use of fossil fuels to
the maximum extent, so that reductions in oil use may be opposed by these
industries . Because of the intemational character of the industry , also the
influence of this sector on international organizations may be very  large.
Environmental pressure groups
A fïnal important group are environmental pressure groups. As discussed
before, these may be relatively weak, because they have to combine opinions of
a lot of people, which may result  in free rider behaviour and in a latent group.
An exception are local and regional groups, which may play an important role
when a group of individuals is facing local extemalities, like noise annoyance and
visual intrusion. These groups are often relatively small, which makes free rider
behaviour more difficult. At the same time the objectives  of such a group are
usually pronounced and clear, which makes the group stronger. Well-known
examples are the so-called NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) pressure groups,
which oppose  large infrastructure  projects.  These groups operate  often  in a very
effective  way .
Also at the national leve1 however,  environmental groups may be important.
Their influence may increase because of alarming information provided e.g. by
scientists (e.g., the Club of Rome, the recent IPCC-report) or by disasters
(depletion of the ozone  layer, floods), but also because of own field work (e.g.,
noise and odor  annoyance, visual intrusion). As argued above, individuals often
support such groups in order to reduce  their dissonante.  These groups also may
gain support by providing information to the public. The ‘marketing’ of such a
group becomes therefore very  important (e . g . , Greenpeace) . However,  the
environmental groups are mostly considered to be weaker  than their opponents,
not only because of differences in size, but also because they try to achieve
improvements in the long run, while politicians are often focused on the short
term (e.g., employment in the car industry).
From our conceptual model it can be concluded that most forces  have a
negative impact on the attempts to achieve  more sustainability . Most stakehol-
ders in the decision-making  process  seem actually to be in favour of the current
situation, while changes  in the system and society are not popular and are not
shared by large majorities.
Next, we wil1  test our conceptual model in an empirical way , by presenting
various results on expected and desired developments in many  fields that
influence transport and the transport system itself.
13
3 An Empirical Test: From the Expected to the Desired Future of Transport
To investigate empirically in our  paper the future of transport a postal
survey questionnaire has been sent to Dutch transportation experts. In a second
round an earlier version  of both scenarios were validated and commented by the
respondents of the fiist round as wel1  as by a sample of European transport
experts.
The reference year of this experiment is the year 2030; the questions
concern the Western-European passenger transport system. For a detailed
description and accounting of the questionnaire used we refer to Nijkamp et al.
(1996); here we only note that the response rate was 36% (n = 271),  and that
the response gave a representative picture of the sample.
In the questionnaire it was first asked to indicate  both expected and desired
future developments of background factors influencing transport, which can be
found in the spatial, institutional, economie  and socio-psychological field. Next,
the expectations and desires on the use of several conventional and newly
developed transport modes were investigated. In this way it is possible to
construct an expected and a desired scenario, while also the discrepancy between
reality and wish can be investigated. Here we wil1  first concisely describe the
results of this experiment. Next, we wil1  analyse the role of the stakeholders in
more detail.
3.1 Outline of the expected and desired scenario
The main  developments and characteristics of the expected and desired
scenario are presented in Table 1; for a more extensive elaboration of the
scenarios we refer to Nijkamp et al. (1996).
In the experiment it is taken for granted that transport demand  is mainly a
derived demand, influenced by the above mentioned factors. The resulting
transport system is presented in Table 2.
From these tables it can be concluded that in the expected scenario various
trends and underlying factors wil1  not change to a large extent. For example, no
large scale changes  are expected for individual citizens, who are not expected to
modify their behaviour drastically in order to reduce  the extemalities caused by
transport. The same holds  for the govemment, whose policy is not expected to
be sufficiently and clearly focused in one direction. Especially future spatial
developments appear to be a focal point of attention of the various transporta-
tion  experts in the panel used.
In the desired scenario a clear choice is made for a collective  transport
system. Therefore, large scale changes  are necessary in the behaviour of indivi-
duals, as wel1  as in the institutional and economie  environment. At the same
time the govemment should invest  largely in infrastructure  of collective  modes
and take measures to reduce  car use to a large extent. In this way the policy is
clearly focused on regulation of the transport sector and on the stimulation of a
modal shift towards collective  modes.
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Table 1 Main  churacteristics sf the expected  and desired scenario
Spatial
Institutional
Economie
Socio-psy- * Individualization trend con-
chological tinues
* Little attention for equity,
both in society and in tran-
sport
burce: Nijkamp et al. (1996)
Expected Scenario
-
Desired Scenario
* Concentration of population
and activities in European
economie  core zone
* Moderately compact city
introduced
* Peripheral regions develop
positively
* Compact city introduced
* NO clear policy-orientation
toward sustainable transport
* NO clear separation of public
and private responsibilities
(railways, infrastructure)
* Regulatory polities  are
largely introduced
* Infrastructure,  railways etc.
are publicly owned
* Transport system not very
profïtable
* Transport system is rather
profitable
* NO clear policy leve1 which is * Much  centralization in
most important economie  polities  (EU)
* Individualization trend
reverses
* Much  attention for equity,
als0 in transport
Table 2 The expected and desired long-distance and urban  transport system
Expected scenario Desired scenario
Long distance * conventional private cars
dominate modal split
* large scale introduction
HST
* collective  modes offer
supplementary service
* Collective  modes
dominate (HST, trams)
* Conventional fuels largely
replaced by new lùels
(electricity, liquid
1 hydrogen)
Urban * More introduction of metro
and light rail
* Introduction electric cars
* Conventional cars most
* Collective  modes
dominate
* Car use heavily restricted
* Walking  and cycling
urce:
important
Nijkamp et al. (1996)
increases
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As demonstrated by Rienstra et al. (1995),  the expected scenario wil1  not
result  in large scale reductions of the use of conventional fuels and CO 2
emissions; the desired scenario however,  might result  in reductions - depending
on several assumptions - of about 80%,  which may be sufficient for achieving a
‘sustainable’ emission level.
3.2 The role of the stakeholders in the expected scenario
It is clear that there are large discrepancies between the expected and
desired future of passenger transport. It is now interesting to analyse whether the
stakeholders identified in the conceptual model of Section  2 behave in the way
assumed, resulting in a system which is not expected to move to sustainability (as
is indicated by about 80% of the respondents).
Individuals
One of the striking features of the expected scenario is that individuals are
not prepared to sacrifice for a sustainable transport system. In general,  they are
not expected to change their behaviour, e.g. by travelling by public instead of
private modes, by living in compact cities and by a reversal of the
individualization trend. These trends may be regarded as an extrapolation of past
trends, and may be explained by cognitive  dissonante  theories (see Subsection
2.1).
í?he  govemment
The govemment in the expected scenario is rather  ambiguous. Al1  kinds of
measures are taken, but there seems not to be a clear policy focus. Car use is to
some extent restricted by road pricing, parking measures, etc. These measures
are not introduced  in a sufficient way, however.  The policy also fails in providing
sufficient altematives by large scale investments in collective  modes and their
infrastructure,  while also the responsibility (public, private) for the provision of
these services is not wel1  organized.
The only policy which is expected to be introduced  is a rather  strict spatial
policy at both the urban and European level, aiming  at geographical concentra-
tion  and a compact urban spatial structure.  Such a policy reduces travel distances
and creates voluminous travel demand  per trip, and as a result  collective  modes
become more competitive. Apparently, there wil1  be a consensus in society on
these issues, which is rather  striking since the living conditions in a compact city
may not always be very  preferable. It may be the case, that nature  parks etc.,
become increasingly important in the opinion of individuals, while civil servants
wil1  tend to like the regulation of the spatial structure.
International organizations
International organizations are not expected to dominate the politica1 scene.
In the area of economie  and transport policy, for example the European Union,
is not expected to become the most important authority. This makes it difficult
to coordinate polities  and to reduce  intemational extemalities. In this way free
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rider behaviour of individual countries becomes an attractive  option. This may
explain why several measures - like road pricing, increasing me1 prices,  restric-
ting car use - may not be introduced to a sufficient  extent, because it affects the
competitive  position of individual countries. At the same time, this hampers  the
coordination of the construction of a network of collective modes, like the HST-
network. An advantage may be that the decision-making  process takes less time
and that less compromises are necessary, but this is not expected to compensate
for the disadvantages.
Pressure groups
Pressure groups, fmally , seem to behave like is assumed in the conceptual
model. Therefore, individual car use is stil1 dominant, while little changes  are
introduced in the transport system. The car and oil industry succeed in reducing
the dissonante  of individuals, and influence the trade off between short-term
(economie)  and long-term (environmental) issues within national and intema-
tional authorities. Environmental groups wil1  apparently not be successful in
changing these opinions, as is explained by the conceptual model. The same
holds  for railway companies,  who are not able to gain a larger market share.
In conclusion, the conceptual model presented in Section  2 appears to offer
a reasonable mapping  of expected real-world  developments. The main  stakehol-
ders in the process seem to behave in the way predicted in this model. As a
result,  the system is not expected to change in the direction of more sustainabi-
lity. Next, it is interesting to investigate how  the stakeholders should act in order
to achieve  a more sustainable transport system according to the Dutch transpor-
tation experts in our sample.
3.3 The role of the stakeholders in the desired scenario
In the desired scenario a clear choice is made for regulation and the stimula-
tion  of collective transport modes. This requires an entirely different behaviour
of distinct stakeholders.
Individuals
Individuals may be the starting point for the necessary changes,  because in a
democratie  society with an economy  based on free market principles,  both the
government and the industry wil1  fïnally  follow these opinions. In the desired
scenario the individuals are more or less forced - but also prepared - to reduce
car use and to use collective modes or to shift to cycling and walking.  Such a
behaviour can only be achieved, when the dissonante  of individuals becomes so
large that they change their behaviour. This may be achieved by the provision of
information in a way which can not be denied; another possibility is that the
negative consequences of the current mobility behaviour become so clear (e.g.,
by a disaster) that individuals wil1  change their behaviour. An important remark
in this respect is that there should be alternatives available for current car use;
large scale investments in collective modes are therefore necessary .
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The govemment
The national government should - in the desired scenario - shift responsibi-
lities to regions and intemational organizations (regionalization and centrali-
zation);  therefore the influence of this government leve1 wil1  decrease. Intema-
tional extemalities should be coped with by international organizations, while
local and regional extemalities might be coped by regional and local authorities.
In this way the subsidiarity principle  may also hold for the transport policy .
When  this is achieved, free rider behaviour of national govemments can be
avoided, because relevant measures are compulsory . The task of govemments is
to focus their polities  clearly on the provision of collective  modes and the reduc-
tion  of car use. Large scale investments are necessary in the infrastructure  of
these modes. In the urban areas also a policy focused on the compact city may
be a key success factor for the achievement of the desired direction.
It is clear that in this situation both national politicians and civil servants
should be prepared to give up part of their authority, while at present this leve1
is very  influential. It is obvious that this wil1  cause many  problems in practice.
These may first be found in the utility functions of politicians, which have to
support this shift. They also should be more focused on long term sustainability
issues instead of short term electoral  success.
In the government also incentives should be introduced  for achieving clear
targets for civil  servants, e.g. by setting a clear time path which can easily be
checked  by the media and individuals. Also incentives (e.g., monetary , promo-
tion, etc.) can be given to civil servants, in order to change their utility functions.
In this way regulation should not be reduced, but made much more effective  in
order to serve the achievement of genera1 sustainability objectives  and a societal
optimal result.
International organizations
As mentioned above, intemational organizations should become more
important, while also some competente  should shift to regional authorities. In
this way externalities may be coped with at the leve1 where they occur. It is clear
that several measures can be introduced  much easier than at the national leve1
(road pricing, increase in fuel prices,  cooperation of railway companies).  How-
ever, it is necessary that the decision-making  process  within these organizations
wil1  change. National  interest should not be a main  issue in this process,  there-
fore these organizations should become more independent of national govern-
ments. Therefore, an authority like the EU should gain more independente;  the
decision-making  process  should become faster and more efficient.  At the same
time however,  there should be more democratie  control,  since otherwise the
decision-making  process  wil1  be steered by pressure groups and the civil  servants
of these organizations. Instead, individuals - with opinions as discussed  before -
should steer these organizations. When  this is not achieved the legitimacy of
these organizations is at stake and policy measures wil1  not be accepted in
society.
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Pressure groups
Pressure groups, finally, should largely change their attitude. The car
industry follows mainly the demand  of individuals. As a result  of this scenario,
the car industry wil1  largely diminish, while new technology wil1  be based on the
cars powered by electricity or other altemative fuels. Therefore, this industry
should not protect  its current position, but develop new markets  and strategies.
For example, by shifting funds to the development and promotion of ‘zero-
emission’ cars. An entirely new market may be found in the development of new
collective  modes and the production of these modes. When  the desired scenario
wil1  become reality, a lot of production capacity and funds are needed and a
large market may be found in this field. This capacity may largely be found in
the car industry .
The oil industry may loose its position to an even larger extent, since the use
of fossil  fuels may largely diminish. However,  also in the future there wil1
continue to be a high demand  for energy in order to power the transport system.
This industry should therefore focus on the development of new sustainable
energy forms; a shift which wil1  probably only succeed when there is a sufficient
leve1 of demand  in their market.
Railway companies  and urban transit authorities should change their attitude
from defending their protected position and subsidies towards a market-oriented
organization. In the desired scenario their market potential is extremely high; the
railway companies  should therefore be much more eager to meet this challenge.
As a result,  more flexibility, efficiency and market orientation is a sine qua non
for the success of such a policy. In this way also the profitability of this system
should largely increase .
Environmental pressure groups finally, may play a vita1 role in making
society more conscious about the environmental consequences of mobility and in
creating dissonante  in society. These groups should therefore carefully present
their information to individuals, the government and intemational organizations.
Of course, the credibility and public acceptance of these organizations is
important.
4 Conclusions
From the conceptual model developed in Section  2 it may be concluded that
most forces  in the decision-making  process  hamper  the development of polities
clearly focused on sustainability in the transport sector. This observation also
holds  when the expectations of transportation experts are analysed: most trends
are expected to continue and wil1  not change to a large extent. In the desired
future, however,  the role of the stakeholders differs largely from the expected
future. When  this scenario becomes reality, a more sustainable future may be
achieved .
Clearly , the current decision-making  process  wil1  not stimulate the transfor-
mation  towards a sustainable transport system, although this need and the
related objective  is acknowledged by a large majority in society. Individuals
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may - and in a democratie  society with an economy  based on free market
principles  should - be the starting point of possible changes.  At least three key
success factors  may be identified.
First, it is necessary that the information about the external  effects of the
current mobility behaviour becomes so appealing that it creates a dissonante
that is so large that individuals want to change their behaviour. Environmental
groups, scientists, and national and intemational authorities may play an impor-
tant role in the provision of this information. When  this occurs, governments
carmot deny  this trend, and measures may have a strong support in society. New
ways of information provision may have to be found, therefore. In the end the
(car and oil) industry wil1  have to follow the demand  of their market and offer
such alternatives in order to survive.
A second  key success factor is the presence of appealing alternatives for the
current mobility behaviour (new technologies, collective  transport modes) (see
also Rienstra et al., 1996). When  these are not available, individuals are not able
to change their behaviour and attitude, even if they want to do this. The govern-
ment should invest  heavily in the infrastructure  of collective  modes, so that
alternatives become available; a clear policy for stimulating such a shift is a
necessary condition  too. Railways should be prepared to change their organi-
zation  and provide  an alternative for the current car system, in cooperation with
other providers of collective  transport (urban public transport, bus companies,
taxi companies).  Finally, the car and oil industry should invest  in alternatives and
have to find new markets  and strategies.
The third success factor however,  may be most important. A rigorous
psychological and cultural turn a round seems to be necessary in the whole
society. Al1  stakeholders need to change their attitude and cooperate in order to
cape  the challenge of making  the radical shift towards a sustainable society.
When  there is such a willingness among al1 stakeholders, new policy options and
strategies may be identified and introduced,  and a sustainable transport system
may become a realistic and deliberate option.
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